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Abstract 
This paper studies the effects of school choice on segregation. We analyze the 
effect of a reform in Stockholm that changed the admission system of public 
upper secondary schools. Before the year 2000, students had priority to the 
school situated closest to where they lived, but from the fall of 2000 and 
onwards, admission is based on grades only. We show that the distribution of 
students over schools changed dramatically as a response to extending school 
choice. As expected, the new admission policy increased segregation by ability. 
However, segregation by family background, as well as, segregation between 
immigrants and natives also increased significantly.  
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1 Introduction 
The debate around school choice is centered on two key questions. The propo-
nents of school choice argue that the competitive forces released by school 
choice increase efficiency. This increase in efficiency benefits all students, also 
those not exercising choice themselves (e g Hoxby 2003). The opponents tend 
to be concerned about the effects on those left behind; arguing that choice 
merely increases segregation. According to a typical argument, the students 
will be increasingly sorted according to family background or ability. If peer 
groups are important to the student outcomes, the students who get into better 
schools benefit, both because of higher school quality, and because they 
interact with better peers. On the other hand, the students left behind suffer not 
only because of lower school quality but also because of the decrease in the 
average peer quality (e g Fiske & Ladd 2000). 
By now, the evidence on the efficiency effects from school choice is accu-
mulating mainly based on various voucher programs and charter schools 
operating in the United States. In contrast, peer effects and, therefore, the 
consequences of changes in the way that students are allocated across schools 
have proven to be hard to estimate. Most promising attempts to evaluate peer 
effects have been based on small scale controlled experiments (Falk & Ichino 
2003) and on natural experiments randomly assigning individuals to peer 
groups (Sacerdote 2001; Katz, Kling & Liebman 2001) 
In this paper we examine how a large scale reform that expands school 
choice affects sorting of students across schools. We use data from a reform 
that changed the admission rules to the upper secondary schools and evaluate 
the effects of these changes on segregation. We focus on sorting in three 
dimensions: ability, family background and immigrant status. As we will 
demonstrate below, the reform increased sorting in all observable dimensions. 
Our results are similar to findings from English data by Burgess et al (2004), 
who report that sorting according to ability, ethnicity and income are positively 
related to the feasibility of school choice, and that different admission systems 
produce different degrees of segregation. The key difference between their 
paper and the current study is that while Burgess et al examine the relationship 
between degree of choice and segregation in a cross-section, we study the 
effects of a reform that extended choice by weakening the link between school 
assignment and the neighborhood. IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform 
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In some sense school choice existed in Sweden already since the beginning 
of the 1990s, long before the 2000 admission reform. The students could apply 
to any school within the municipality and even across the municipality borders 
if the home municipality agreed to pay the costs. However, if the schools were 
oversubscribed the admission was based on the place of residence and those 
living closest to a school were given first preference. Therefore, the admission 
system prior to the recent reform resembled intra-district open-enrollment 
policies in the US (Cullen et al 2000).  
The admission system in Stockholm changed fundamentally in 2000. All 
residence-based admission criteria were abolished and admissions became 
based on previous grades only. The intention was to reduce the effects of resi-
dential segregation and to open up the option of attending the most prestigious 
schools in downtown Stockholm for all students, irrespective of where they 
lived.    
As a first step in our analysis we calculate various mobility measures to 
demonstrate that the reform that opened new options had an impact on the 
school choices. We then evaluate the effects of the reform on segregation. We 
analyze data from the two years immediately before the reform and compare 
various measures of segregation to the two years after the reform. To isolate the 
effect of the reform from other simultaneous changes, we compare the changes 
in segregation across schools to changes in segregation across residential areas, 
and compare the changes in Stockholm where the admission system changed to 
the changes in surrounding communities where the admission system retained 
residence-based selection rules. In contrast to many previous papers we also 
calculate standard errors for the measures of segregation and adjust the 
measures so that we compare the observed level of segregation to the expected 
level under random allocation. This enables us to attach standard errors to our 
difference-in-differences estimates and to conclude that the admission reform 
increased segregation in a statistically significant way.  
In the next section, we will describe in some detail the admission system 
and the changes due to the reform. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4, 
we report measures examining the effects of the admission reform on student 
mobility patterns and after that, in section 5, discuss some measurement issues 
related to segregation. In section 6 we report the main results on the effects of 
the reform on segregation, and in section 7 we make some concluding 
comments.  
 IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform  5 
2  The Swedish school system  
The Swedish public school system begins with pre-school, and continues with 
nine years of compulsory schooling. A student can then apply to the upper 
secondary school. About 90% of the student population complete the ninth 
grade and are eligible for upper secondary schooling. Of those, 98% continue 
to upper secondary schooling. With completed upper secondary schooling the 
student can apply for university or post-secondary education. 
 
2.1  Regular compulsory school 
All children between the ages of 7 and 16 have to attend school. Most schools 
are public and most children attend the school closest to home, but the parents 
can choose other public schools or private schools. Also the private schools are 
financed by grants from the students’ home municipality, so it might be more 
appropriate to call them independent or charter schools. The private schools 
may have special focus, concerning pedagogical issues, language/ethnicity or 
religion, but most often they provide general education very much like the 
regular public schools. The private schools have to be approved by the National 
Agency for Education.  
Grades are given from the eighth grade. Grades per subject are set by the 
teachers, and include one of the following possible grades: Pass (G), Pass with 
Distinction (VG), and Pass with Special Distinction (MVG). The system of 
grades was changed in 1995, and those leaving the ninth grade in 1998 were 
the first cohort with the new system where teachers shall base their assessment 
according to stated achievement goals. In principle, these criteria are absolute, 
not relative, but there is no guarantee that grading standards are equal across 
schools. In cases where a student fails to achieve a passing grade in a subject, 
no grade is given. The final certificate from the ninth grade is called “merit-
värde”. It consists of the sum of the 16 best classes, where G earns a student 10 
credits, VG 15 credits and MVG 20 credits. A student who has finished the 
ninth grade, and has passed in Math, Swedish and English is eligible for upper 
secondary schooling.  
 
2.2 Upper  secondary  school 
All municipalities in Sweden are by law obliged to offer upper secondary 
schooling to all students that have completed their compulsory schooling. The 
upper secondary school consists of 17 national programs and several special IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform 
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programs, all built on separate courses chosen by the student. All programs last 
for three years and provide eligibility for the university and other post-
secondary level schools. Most municipalities do not have all programs, and the 
student then has the right to attend such a program in another municipality, 
financed by the municipality where he or she resides. 
Also most upper secondary schools are public schools run by the local 
municipality. At the upper secondary level, there are two types of private 
schools. Most schools offer education corresponding to the public upper 
secondary schools (and receive municipal grants). In addition, there are schools 
offering supplementary programs, for example, fine arts and handicraft. In 
1998, there were 60 private upper secondary schools located in 35 of the 288 
Swedish municipalities. The total number of students in private schools was 
8 822, that is about 2.8% of the student population. In Stockholm, there were 
13 private schools where 6.5% of the student population attended. The number 
of private schools is continually increasing. In 2001, there were already 149 
private upper secondary schools in Sweden, with a total of 17 887 students.  
 
2.3  The Stockholm admission reform 
The design of the local educational system rests in the hands of the munici-
pality. In Stockholm, the political right carried through a reform of public 
upper secondary schooling in 2000. Up to 1999 a student had priority to the 
upper secondary school that was situated closest to home. This residence-based 
admission system was called “närhetsprincipen”. A student only applied for a 
program, with grades deciding admission. Students could express wishes about 
which school to go to, but the ones living close to a specific school had 
priority. In practice, this implied that the Local Admissions Unit (“Intagnings-
enheten”) first counted the number of places per program in the municipality. 
They then ranked the student choices according to grades, and accepted 
students to a certain program. Given acceptance, the Local Admissions Unit 
distributed the students to the specific schools based on residence and commu-
nication opportunities.  
The cohort that applied to upper secondary school in the fall of 2000 was 
the first cohort of students who applied to both program (including speciali-
zation) and school. Students were then ranked according to their grades, and 
those with highest grades among the applicants to each school were admitted. 
This grade-based system became known as “betygsprincipen”. If a student was IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform  7 
not accepted to his/her first choice, the second is considered and so forth (USK 
2002). 
Stockholm is not the only municipality reorganizing the admission to upper 
secondary school. Gothenburg and Malmö, the second and the third largest 
cities in Sweden, have also reformed their admission systems. In Gothenburg, 
the private schools use a strict grade procedure, while the public schools use a 
hybrid form of lottery and grades. In Malmö, in those cases where the program 
is available at different schools, the applicants are allocated to schools 
according to the grades.     
 
 
3  Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data comes from the database of the Institute for Labour Market Policy 
Evaluation (IFAU) in Uppsala. The data cover all students in the educational 
system. From this database we select all students who graduated in the spring 
of 1998, 1999, 2000 or 2001 from a regular compulsory school situated in the 
Stockholm County, which consists of the Stockholm City and the surrounding 
municipalities. We then follow these students, creating four cohorts of first 
year students in the upper secondary school. The two first cohorts applied to 
the upper secondary school prior to the admission reform and the two latter 
cohorts after the reform.  
For these four cohorts we have information about the students’ gender, age, 
immigrant status, parish of residence, regular compulsory school attended, final 
grades when leaving regular compulsory school, upper secondary school 
attended, parental income, parental education and parents’ immigrant status. A 
family in this data is defined as those living in the same household as the 
student, when the student was 16 years old. 
 
3.1 Definition  of  variables 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics. Since we will later use a difference-in-
difference analysis, we show the figures separately for the Stockholm City and 
the rest of the county, labeled “Comparison”.  
Grades (GPA) can take the values from 0 (worst) to 320 (best). 1
st genera-
tion immigrant refers to students that are born outside Sweden, and “1
st & 2
nd 
generation immigrant” to those who are born outside Sweden or has at least 
one parent born outside Sweden. Parental income is the sum of the two parents’ IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform 
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income. Therefore, parental income captures the effect of having parents that 
are working or not working, and also the effect of living with one or two 
parents. Parental education indicates that the student has at least one parent 
with a university degree. Private regular and private upper secondary schools 
are defined according to the status of schools where the student attended.  
From Table 1 it can be noted that the student population is rather stable in 
terms of most background variables. Most notable exception is that the share of 
students attending private schools is increasing over time. The increase in the 
number of schools is also driven by opening of new private schools. Another 
trend that is worth noting is that the average grades appear to be increasing 
over time. 
In terms of characteristics of the secondary school students displayed in 
Table 1, the students from outside Stockholm are rather similar to the students 
within the city. The Stockholm students are slightly more likely to be immi-
grants, and have more educated parents and better grades, but the differences 
are not large. Hence the other 25 municipalities in the County should be well 
suited to be used as a comparison group for the Stockholm students. Maybe the 
best argument for the choice of the comparison group is the current discussion 
of creating one unified upper secondary school area of the entire County. 
The Stockholm municipality is divided into 28 geographical parishes, the 
unit which we use in measuring mobility and residential segregation. A parish 
is also the smallest geographical unit available in our data. The size of the 
parishes varies substantially. Smaller parishes are located in the central part of 
the city. On average, a parish has about 200 students per cohort. The inner city 
parishes are wealthier and more educated. The public upper secondary schools 
are spread out over the whole municipality, while the private schools are more 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
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Parishes  Stockholm  28 28 28 28 
 Comparison  110  109  109  99 
Schools  Stockholm  39 41 47 49 
  Comparison  53 58 68 72 
Students  Stockholm  5 566  5 826  5 945  6 187 
  Comparison  10 784  10 855  11 412  11 710 




As an indication of what happened after the reform, we begin with studying 
student mobility. We suspect that the mobility has increased and allocation of 
the students across schools has changed as a result of the reform. In Table 2 we 
display measures capturing the mobility patterns in the Stockholm City.  
The average commuting distance from home to school is a rough measure of 
mobility across geographical regions. We can locate each school and each 
student to a certain parish. Based on the map coordinates of the mid-point of 
each parish, we can calculate the commuting distance. In Table 2 it is clear that 
the distance increases, particularly for the reform year, from 4.2 km to 4.8. We 
did suspect that this increase in mobility was due to private schools. Calcu-
lating the average commuting distance for public schools only, gives 4.1 km in 
1999 and 4.7 km in 2000. The mobility pattern does not seem to be driven by 
private schools.  
The second row of Table 2 calculates the share of students going to school 
in another area than where they live. The area is defined by the home parish 
and all adjoining parishes. A sharp increase is observed. In 1998 the fraction of 
students going to school in another area than where they live was 45%, and in 
2001 it had increased to 63%. 
 
Table 2. Different mobility measures  











Share of students going to 
school in another area than 









Market share of three most 
common schools in parish 
0.57 0.53 0.44 0.42 
 
Finally we calculate an index that aim to measure the variation in the school 
choices among the students who live in the same parish. It is the “market 
share” of the three largest schools attended by the students in the same parish. 
It is calculated by parish and then averaged over parishes using the number of 
students in the parish as weights. The measure indicates that the variation in IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform  11 
school choices among the students who live in the same parish has increased. 
The increase is rather large. In 1998 the average market share of the three most 
popular schools in each parish was 57%. By 2001, the market share of the three 
most popular schools has declined by 15 percentage points to 42%. The 
steepest decline in the market share of the most popular schools coincides with 
the admission reform in 2000. However, part of the increase in dispersion in 
school choices appears to be unrelated to the reform. Most natural explanation 
is the growth of the private schools but even this does not fully explain the 
trend in the dispersion. A similar analysis for the public schools only displays 
larger levels, but very similar changes. 
 
 
5 Measuring  segregation 
Finding that students traveled greater distances to schools, and that the 
dispersion of choices among students from the same parish increased, shows 
that the reform had its expected effect: the place of residence became less 
important for school choices after the reform. This implies that some other 
factors, especially previous grades, have become more important, and that the 
students will be increasingly sorted or segregated across schools according to 
the ability differences.  
The methods for measuring segregation have a long history in the sociologi-
cal literature. Various segregation indices have been designed since the 1950’s. 
Typical early applications were concerned with dichotomous racial categoriza-
tions, most often between white and minority populations.   
The most common measure of segregation is the dissimilarity index, often 
called the Duncan index according to Duncan & Duncan (1955). The dissimi-

















where J is the number of categories (e g schools), A is the number of individu-
als belonging to group A (e g race) and B the number of individuals belonging 
to group B. As and Bs are the corresponding numbers of individuals belonging 
to these groups in category s. The index measures the sum of the absolute IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform 
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differences in the fraction of the groups in each category. If the groups are 
evenly divided across categories, so that the fraction of the group in each 
school equals its share in the population, the index is zero indicating that there 
is no segregation. The index reaches its maximum value of one when there is 
total segregation, so that the student body in each school consists of only a 
single group. Another common interpretation of the dissimilarity index is that it 
expresses the proportion of members of one of the two groups that need to 
move in order to achieve an equal distribution of both groups in all categories.     
A major weakness of the dissimilarity index is that it can measure only 
segregation among dichotomous groupings. Because segregation indices were 
mainly used to measure segregation between the black and white populations, 
there was not much need to develop measures that could accommodate more 
than two groups. More recent developments in the racial patterns, as well as, 
applications of segregation measures to other problems have created a need to 
develop measures that can be applied to multiple groups.  
A simple “segregation index”, that can be used with continuous variables, 
and which is also probably most intuitive for the economists, is the ratio of the 
between school variance to the total variance (R
2). Essentially this measures the 





























where yi is refers to the characteristics of the individual i,  s y  to the average 
over students in school s, and  y  to the overall mean. R
2 reaches the maximum 
value of 1 when all units within groups are equal, so that across group variance 
equals total variance, and it is zero when there is no variation across groups, i.e. 
the means of each group are equal. A simple way of calculating R
2 is to regress 




5.1  Sampling variation and random segregation 
There are two important issues that have to be accounted for when interpreting 
the segregation indices. First, like all sample statistics also the segregation 
indices are influenced by sampling variability. This is particularly important IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform  13 
when analyzing changes in segregation. We would like to evaluate whether the 
observed changes in segregation are statistically significant or whether they 
could occur by chance. Still, most studies of segregation provide no informa-
tion on the sampling variability of the estimates. This is slightly odd given that 
often the whole purpose of condensing information to a single segregation 
index is to be able to compare the levels of segregation in different places or 
the changes in segregation over time. 
Second, even if the population were randomly allocated to the different 
categories, the allocation would not be completely even. The usual segregation 
indices measure the extent that the allocation deviates from evenness, instead 
of measuring the deviation from the random allocation. Simulation results by 
Carrington & Troske (1997) indicate that the most common indices of 
segregation indicate substantial segregation even when the population is 
randomly allocated across groups. The deviation from evenness is particularly 
strong when the categories are small or when the minority share is small. As an 
extreme example, Carrington & Troske note that if a large population of men 
and women are randomly allocated into categories of two, 50% of categories 
would consist of one man and one woman, while the other 50% would consist 
of only men or only women. Most segregation indices would report substantial 
gender segregation in this case. Furthermore, the dependence of segregation 
indices on the size distribution of the categories causes problems when 
comparing the segregation indices calculated over categories of varying size.  
Both these problems are important for analyzing the change in the segrega-
tion after the admission reform in Stockholm. Calculating standard errors or 
confidence bands for the indices is, of course, necessary if we wish to claim 
that segregation changed due to the reform. We would also like to compare the 
extent of segregation across the schools to the residential segregation. Both 
schools and our geographical units are rather small (In 2000, the average cohort 
size in Stockholm schools was 135, and the average parish had 212 students). 
Also the size distribution of schools and parishes is different implying that the 
segregation indices measuring segregation across schools would get different 
values than indices measuring segregation across parishes even if the student 
population were randomly allocated both across the schools and across the 
geographical units. Even more importantly, the number of schools has 
increased over time, and this increase could change the values of the segrega-
tion indices even if no changes in segregation occurred. IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform 
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In this paper we follow the suggestion of Carrington & Troske (1997) and 
adjust the segregation indices to measure the deviation from randomness, 
instead of measuring the deviation from evenness. We, therefore, first calculate 
the expected values of each segregation index according to the random 
allocation, given the school size distribution each year. Since analytical 
expressions for finite samples and varying category sizes are hard to calculate, 
we do this by simulation. We reallocate randomly the students to schools 
keeping the size distribution of schools fixed. We draw 500 random replica-
tions from this reshuffled data and take the mean of these random draws as the 
expected value of the segregation index.    
We then calculate the adjusted segregation indices by subtracting the 
expected segregation index from the observed segregation index. For example, 









= ,  
 
where D* is the expected segregation index under random allocation. As the 
original dissimilarity index, also the adjusted index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 
indicating that segregation equals expected segregation under random 
allocation, and 1 that there is complete segregation.
1  
In our sample the expected values of the segregation indices under random 
allocation appear to be only moderate in size. For example, the expected 
dissimilarity index on segregation of income groups across schools in 1998 is 
0.066, and the same index on segregation between natives and immigrants in 
1998 is 0.087. The increase in the number of schools and the corresponding 
decrease in the average school size do not appear to have a major effect. The 
expected values of segregation indices change only slightly when the number 
of schools increases. A partial reason for this is that new schools are rather 
small and their weight on the segregation indices rather small.  
Finally, to evaluate the extent of sampling variation in the adjusted segrega-
tion indices, we calculated the bootstrap standard errors for all the segregation 
measures. We drew with replacement 500 replications of size N from the 
                                                      
1 In principle, it is also possible that there is excess unevenness if the observed segregation is 
smaller than expected segregation under random allocation. In this case D < D*, and the adjusted 
segregation index would get negative values.  IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform  15 
original sample and calculated the segregation indices for each draw. The 
standard deviation of these draws provided us with the standard error for each 
segregation index. Since we adjust each segregation index, we also need to 




6  Results on segregation 
We have measured segregation along three dimensions: ability, immigrant 
status and family background. For each dimension, we calculate measures of 
segregation for the Stockholm schools and the comparison schools. We then 
evaluate the effect of the reform by comparing the change in Stockholm City to 
the change in the rest of the Stockholm County. We also calculate measures of 
residential segregation, and compare the changes in school and residential 
segregation in Stockholm. The entire analysis is conducted for both the Duncan 
(dissimilarity) index and the R
2-index. In all cases, the two indices produce the 
same qualitative result: segregation increases. The only difference between the 
two indexes is in the significance level.
2  
In the next three subsections we present the baseline results on the changes 
in segregation after the admission reform. After showing these results we will 
discuss the effect of the private schools and the effects of schools that closed 
down or opened up during the period under study. 
 
6.1 Ability 
We use grades when leaving regular compulsory school as a measure of ability. 
Since the mean and the variance of grades vary over time, we use percentile 
ranked grades in our calculations for the R
2-index. This does not make a big 
difference: both the levels and the changes in segregation indices are very 
similar in the original grades than when using percentiles. When calculating the 
Duncan index, we compare the highest achieving quartile to the rest but the 
                                                      
2 We also calculated the Theil entropy index of segregation, but the qualitative results were very 
similar. We have chosen to display only the Duncan index and the R
2-index because of the 
popularity and commonness of the two measures. Results with the Theil-index are available from 
the authors upon request.  IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform 
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results appear to be quite robust to other groupings. The results on segregation 
on ability are presented in Table 3.  
According to the results, there is a sharp increase in segregation by ability in 
the Stockholm schools. In 1998, 30.4 percent of the variation in the previous 
grades could be explained by the school attended. This fraction increases to 
58.3 percent by 2001. The estimates are precise with small standard errors so 
that the differences across years are statistically significant. Interestingly, 
segregation increases already before the reform. For example, the R
2-index 
increases by 9.5 percentage points already between 1998 and 1999, a year 
before the reform. The increase in the reform year between 1999 and 2000 are 
still clearly larger than increases before or after the reform. 
Part of the observed increase in segregation appears to be unrelated to the 
reform. Most plausible explanations have to do with the changes in the 
residential segregation and with the increase of the fraction of students going to 
private schools. None of these explanations fully explains the observed 
patterns. First, as can be seen in Table 3, residential segregation has increased 
in Stockholm, but more so between 2000 and 2001. Around the reform year, 
between 1999 and 2000, residential segregation was rather stable in Stockholm. 
As we will show later, the growth of the private school sector or closing of 
some public schools do not explain the results either.  
To isolate the reform effect from other simultaneous changes we calculated 
difference-in-difference estimates. We compared the changes in segregation 
across schools in Stockholm in the consecutive years to the corresponding 
changes in the comparison area. We also made a similar comparison between 
changes in segregation across schools and segregation across residential areas. 
The results indicate a large reform effect. Between 1999 and 2000 the 
segregation indices increased 12–15 percentage points more in Stockholm than 
in the comparison group and segregation across schools increased 11-14 
percentage points more than segregation across the residential areas. These 
estimates are statistically significant and different measures of segregation give 
similar estimates. Segregation across Stockholm schools increased more than 
segregation in the comparison area or segregation across residential areas the 
year before the reform, but the difference is smaller than in the reform year. 
To sum up we conclude that ability sorting in the Stockholm schools has 
dramatically increased as a result of the reform. We find it puzzling that 
segregation increases already before the reform and return to the possible 
explanations below.  IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform  17 
Table 3. Segregation by ability 
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Significance level: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10%. Bootstrapped standard errors are in the 
parentheses. Both the indices and their standard errors are adjusted so that they measure 
deviation from random allocation and not from even allocation (See text). We used the delta 
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6.2 Immigrant  status 
Table 4 displays the segregation indices between natives and immigrants. In the 
table we present results where we count both the first and the second genera-
tion immigrants as immigrants. The results indicate that segregation between 
natives and immigrants increased sharply after the reform in the Stockholm 
schools. According to the Duncan index, 19.6% of the immigrant students in 
the Stockholm schools in 2001 would have to be moved to another school to 
achieve a distribution that corresponds to a random allocation. The comparable 
number in 1999 was 13.0%. The point estimates are significantly different at 
the five percent level. During these years there was a slight upward trend also 
in residential segregation. The Duncan index calculated across parishes 
increased from 28.2% to 30.9%, though the increase was not statistically 
significant. There is no clear pattern in the Comparison group.  
The difference-in-difference estimates support the view that the admission 
reform had an effect on segregation. Between 1999 and 2000 the R
2-index 
increased by 2.8% more in the Stockholm schools than in the Comparison 
schools. The increase in the Stockholm schools was also larger than in the 
Stockholm parishes during the reform year, but the difference was not 
statistically significant. Overall there does not seem to be any tight relationship 
between segregation across schools and residential areas in Stockholm. For 
example, between 1998 and 1999 residential segregation increased, while 
school segregation actually decreased. 
 When restricting the definition of immigrants to the “1
st generation”, the 
segregation levels are lower, but the changes are essentially similar. We also 
note that the segregation between schools did not change much prior to the 
reform, but that there is an increase in Stockholm and a decrease in the 
Comparison group after the reform. We have tried different definitions of the 
immigrant status, such as born outside the Nordic countries, or born outside the 
OECD countries. These different definitions do not affect the results. 
It is worth pointing out that the difference between residential segregation 
and school segregation in Stockholm decreased after the reform, mainly 
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Table 4. Segregation by immigrant status 
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6.3 Family  background 
We measured family background with two variables, parents’ education and 
parents’ income, but report in Table 5 only the results on parent’ education. 
Also here segregation across schools clearly increased. The R
2-index increases 
from 10.4% in 1998 to 13.9% in 2001. The point estimates are significantly 
different at the five percent level. In the comparison group the segregation is 
fairly constant; the R
2-index is 10.0% in 1998 and 10.1% in 2001. Also 
residential segregation is stable in both groups.  
The difference-in-difference results indicate a clear reform effect. During 
the reform year, segregation increased by 2.8 percentage points more in the 
Stockholm schools than in the Comparison schools when measured with the 
R
2-index. The Stockholm schools became also significantly more segregated 
than the Stockholm parishes. 
Concerning parental income (not reported in the table), the results were 
rather similar. As with grades, we percentile ranked the parental income for the 
R
2-index. There was a sharp increase in school segregation in Stockholm that 
could not be seen in the comparison group. Residential segregation remained 
stable over the years in both groups. In the difference-in-difference analysis, 
Stockholm schools become significantly more segregated than Comparison 
schools and Stockholm parishes in the reform year. The differences in other 
years are not statistically significant.
3 
According to all indices, the school segregation and residential segregation 
on family background were at the same level in 1998. After the reform the 
school segregation in Stockholm sharply increased while residential segrega-
tion remained stable. We find the evidence clear; sorting on family background 








                                                      
3 For example, the increase in the Duncan index for the Stockholm schools was 5.5% larger than 
Comparison schools, and 6.9% larger than Stockholm parishes. Both differences were 
statistically significant. IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform  21 
Table 5. Segregation by parental education 
  
Segregation between schools 
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6.4  Possible explanations for the observed patterns 
In addition to the admission reform, there were two other important events that 
might have had an impact on segregation. First, the fraction of the Stockholm 
students in the private schools increased from 12 to 20 percent between 1998 
and 2001. Second, the number of schools increased from 39 to 49, mostly due 
to new private schools opening up. In fact, the number of new schools was 
even larger, because seven schools closed down between 1998 and 2001. Both 
the increase in the fraction of private school students and the changes in the 
school structure may have an effect on student sorting. 
To isolate the effect of the admission reform from the effects of changes in 
the fraction of students in the private schools we repeated all calculations 
reported in tables 3 to 5 using only the public school students. We also repeated 
the calculation using only schools that existed over the whole four-year period.
4  
To our surprise neither the increase in the private schools nor the closing 
down or opening up schools had a major effect on the results. Neither could 
they explain why the segregation indices in some cases increased already 
before the reform. For example, segregation along ability, measured by the R
2-
index, in the Stockholm public schools was 22.9% in 1998, 33.5% in 1999, 
51.5% in 2000 and 57.5% in 2001. Comparing these numbers to the corre-
sponding index in the first row of Table 3, reveals that the level of segregation 
is lower when only public schools are included but that changes are very 
similar. Also in the public schools, there is a large increase in the reform year 
but a puzzling increase already year prior to the reform. Concerning segrega-
tion along the immigrant status, it increased slightly more in the public schools 
than in all schools. This makes the difference-in-differences estimates 
comparing Stockholm schools to Stockholm parishes in Table 4 statistically 
significant in the reform year. Focusing on surviving schools does not make a 
large difference in segregation along any dimensions either. If anything, the 
reform effect stands out more clearly.  
The final issue that we examined was to what extent segregation along 
family background and immigrant status are driven by sorting by ability. 
Grade-based admission system can be expected to increase sorting by ability 
and hence also any other characteristics that happen to be correlated with 
ability. To examine this issue we made an attempt to calculate segregation 
                                                      
4 Full results on all indices calculated over the subsample of the public schools, and schools that 
existed over the whole four-year period, are available from the authors upon request. IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform  23 
indices conditional on ability. For the R
2-index this is relatively straight-
forward. We simply regressed immigrant status and parents’ education on 
ability and school dummies and calculated “partial R
2”, i.e. the variance 
attributable to school dummies in this regression. To allow a flexible 
relationship between ability and other outcome measures we entered ability in 
this regression as decile dummies. The results are reported on the row “partial 
R
2” in Table 6. For the ease of comparison we also replicate the original results 
on unconditional indices from Tables 4 and 5. 
For both immigrant status and the parents’ education conditioning on ability 
decreased the segregation measures. Conditioning on ability also removed the 
reform effect from the segregation along parents’ education. However, the 
pattern in segregation along the immigrant status remained similar to that 
reported in Table 4. Even conditional on ability there was a strong increase in 
the segregation index between 1999 and 2000 and no clear change in the other 
years.    
 
 




  1998 1999 2000 2001 
R
2        
   Stockholm  0.053  0.051  0.067  0.087 
   Comparison  0.067  0.079  0.066  0.086 
Partial R
2        
   Stockholm  0.046  0.041  0.056  0.062 
   Comparison  0.060  0.068  0.056  0.078 
 Parental  education 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
R
2      
   Stockholm  0.104  0.116  0.138  0.139 
   Comparison  0.100  0.108  0.102  0.101 
Partial R
2      
   Stockholm  0.033  0.046  0.047  0.021 
   Comparison  0.046  0.050  0.042  0.039 
 




A key motivation behind the admission reform in Stockholm was that the city 
is geographically quite segregated. There are large differences in the income 
and education levels across the residential areas. The immigrants tend to be 
heavily concentrated to certain neighborhoods. As a result of residence-based 
admission criteria, also the schools are segregated. The system was considered 
unjust because those from less advantaged neighborhoods had little chance of 
attending the best schools.   
The admission reform in 2000 abolished all residence-based admission 
rules. This benefited those with highest grades as new options became available 
and school district borders no longer limited their school choices. The losers 
were those who no longer were accepted to their closest school due to 
competition from students living further away.  
The change in the admission system is only one of the important changes 
that affect segregation of students. Segregation across residential areas has also 
increased. The increase in the private school sector also increases choice 
options and might lead into an increase in segregation across schools. How-
ever, the quantitative importance of these two changes appears to be minor 
compared to the effects of the admission reform. This should not be very 
surprising. Changes in residential segregation are slow compared to sudden 
changes caused by the change in the admission system. Also even though 
private school sector has grown rapidly it still represents a rather small fraction 
of students. For most students, the choice between different public schools is 
far more important than the choice between the public and the private schools.    
As expected, grade-based admission system increased sorting of students to 
schools according to their ability. Less expected was that segregation also 
increased along all other observable dimensions, particularly along the ethnic 
and socio-economic lines. All these changes were reasonably large and 
statistically significant. 
 IFAU – School choice and segregation: evidence from an admission reform  25 
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